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DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT, HOUSING,
AND EDUCATION:
CONSTITUTIONAL CONCEPTS
AND SOCIAL THEORIES'
"Some years ago a famous novelist died. Among his papers
was found a list of suggested plots for future stories, the most
prominently underscored being this one: 'A widely separated fam-
ily inherits a house in which they have to live together.' This is the
great new problem of mankind."'
What the rioters appeared to be seeking was fuller participa-
tion in the social order and the material benefits enjoyed by the
majority of American citizens. Rather than rejecting the American
system they were anxious to obtain a place for themselves in it.2
Introduction
Three hundred years ago the Negro was brought to this country as
a slave.. For the next two hundred years he was oppressed and treated as
a chattel. With his emancipation during the Civil War period, the Negro
began his struggle to establish himself in American society, while segre-
gationists continued their struggle to keep him "in his place." During
the Reconstruction Era, a proliferation of civil rights legislation and three
amendments to the Constitution were passed to secure permanently the
freedom of the Negro and the personal rights commensurate therewith.
t This article is a student work prepared by Frederick D. Braid, a member of the
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW and the St. Thomas More Institute for Legal Research.
Research was completed in January 1970.
1 Alexander, Civil Rights, the Negro Protest and the War on Poverty: Efforts to
Cure America's Social Ills, 41 N.Y.S.B.J. 90 (1969) (quoting Martin Luther King).
2 REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 4 (1968)
[hereinafter REPORT].
Aimed, in many instances, at proscribing
private as well as state initiated or sup-
ported discrimination, the legislation rep-
resented a revolution in the concept of
federalism, and, as such, met with con-
siderable opposition. Reflecting the con-
cern of states' rights advocates, the Su-
preme Court construed the newly adopted
thirteenth and fourteenth amendments
narrowly, stripping them of their intended
effect and rendering much of their enabling
legislation nugatory. Since then, the "house"
has been divided and we have lived the
hypocrisy that the Negro is free. Only re-
cently, as a result of "racial" disorders, has
there been considerable concern over the
reality that the "family" is going to have
to live together if the Negro is to be truly
free-i.e., to have the same opportunities
as the majority to share in the benefits of
our society-and if we are to avoid schism
in the future as uncorrected disparities grow
even wider. Once again there has been a
proliferation of civil rights legislation, and
once again civil rights issues preoccupy the
courts, with many of the restrictions initially
placed on the construction of the post-Civil
War amendments and legislation gradually
eroding. The problem remains the same-
inability to freely exercise one's personal
rights due to discrimination-but the means
used to perpetuate it have, in some in-
stances, become more sophisticated as the
efforts to circumvent the spirit of the law
continue. In other instances, the deep-
rooted nature of the problem renders the
mere removal of discriminatory barriers in-
sufficient to provide the Negro with equal
opportunity. In addition, the interrelation
of many areas and the resultant impact on
progress toward an equal-opportunity so-
ciety preclude a continued piecemeal ap-
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proach to the problem and demand a
coordinated attack on all aspects of the
problem simultaneously. 3 Attention in this
note will be focused on the employment,
housing, and educational fields, 4 where such
an interrelationship perpetuates conditions
which confine the Negro to the lower socio-
economic strata of our society. 5
Perhaps both symptomatic and causative
of the Negro's plight today is his inability
to secure socially and financially rewarding
3 See Larson, The New Law of Race Relations,
1969 Wis. L. REV. 470, 473.
4 In its recent study of civil disorders, the Na-
tional Advisory Commission (Kerner Commis-
sion) categorized Negro grievances toward em-
ployment and housing as being of "first level
intensity," and those toward education as being
of "second level intensity."
6 It is important to emphasize at the outset that
the problems to be discussed in this note are not
peculiar to the Negro. Although the "underclass"
of our society contains a higher percentage of
Negroes than any other racial group, at least
two-thirds of its members are not Negroes and
more than one half the Negro population does
not belong to this "underclass." See Kaplan,
Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality
for the Negro-The Problem of Special Treat-
ment, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 363, 374 (1966). In
fact, the majority may be whites. See Alexander,
supra note 1, at 95. However, the well docu-
mented history of racial discrimination against
the Negro, as well as the fact that the Negro
is better organized in pressing for reform than
any other group, makes analysis of the Negro
problem more practicable, but may very well
serve to foretell the history of events with other
minority groups if the problem is narrowly de-
fined as a Negro one. The problems confronting
the Negro typify those of the underprivileged
generally. The problem is essentially socio-
economic-initiated and perpetuated by racial
discrimination in some instances-the solutions
for which will benefit the Puerto Rican, Mexican-
American, Appalachian white, and the American
Indian, as well as the Negro. See Kaplan, supra,
at 373.
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employment. Generally, the Negro unem-
ployment rate is about twice that of the
rest of the population and is concentrated
most heavily among the young.0 But the
problem reaches beyond unemployment to
what is known as underemployment-i.e.,
restriction of Negro employment to low
class, low paying jobs.7 Even where efforts
are made to correct un- and underemploy-
ment, the effects of past racial discrimina-
tion may be perpetuated through the use
of such devices as standardized tests for
selecting employees or seniority systems in-
itiated during periods of discrimination to
determine promotion to better jobs. In ad-
dition, the historically discriminatory racial
policies of unions-the champion of work-
ers' rights-have likewise deprived the Ne-
gro of many of the benefits of membership
therein.
The primary result of the employment
problem is to deny the Negro economic
equality with the majority of the population.
This, in turn, has its greatest impact on the
availability of housing for the Negro. His
residential choices are necessarily limited
and confined to inadequate facilities con-
centrated in segregated areas-usually
6 See, e.g., REPORT 7; Kaplan, supra note 5,
at 367. In addition, the employment problem is
particularly urgent because of the impact it has
on the stability of the Negro family structure.
Evidence indicates that periods of low employ-
ment may result in increased desertions among
Negro males. D. MOYNIHAN, THE CASE FOR
NATIONAL ACTION 22 (1965). With respect to
criminal activities, large numbers of idle young-
sters have provided a volatile base for the recent
racial disorders in the country. See REPORT 4.
7 Employment discrimination has been mani-
fested in two ways: difficulty in securing employ-
ment and a disproportionate relegation of Negroes
to low-status, low-wage jobs. See Garfinkel &
ghettos or slums." Moreover, recent at-
tempts to provide federally subsidized, low-
rent housing in "white" areas have, in some
instances, met with opposition in the form
of legislators' refusals to rezone single-
family residential areas to allow the con-
struction of multiple dwelling units. Be-
Cahn, Racial-Religious Designations, Preferential
Hiring and Fair Employment Practices Commis-
sions, 20 LAB. L.J. 357, 358 (1969). Among the
employed, Negroes receive 50 percent less in
income. Kaplan, supra note 5, at 367. In fact,
congressional testimony has indicated that the
average nonwhite with four years of college can
expect to earn less over a lifetime than a white
with no more than an eighth grade education.
Hill, Twenty Years of State Fair Employment
Practices Commissions: A Critical A nalysis with
Recommendations, 14 BUFFALO L. REV. 22, 28
(citing Hearings on S. 773, S. 1210, S. 1211, and
S. 1397 Before the Subcomm. on Employment
and Manpower of the Senate Comm. on Labor
and Public Welfare, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 325
(1963)).
8 There are 163 ghettos in America today.
T. CROSS, BLACK CAPITALISM: STRATEGY FOR
BUSINESS IN THE GHETTO 5 (1969) hereinafter
BLACK CAPITALISM]. They continue to fill at a
rate of about 500,000 people per year, id. at 6,
and more than one half of the Negro families
belonging to the "underclass" live in them, id. at
31. One projection estimates that, if present
trends continue, within fifteen years nearly 75
percent of all nonwhites will be living in slum
areas. See Gibson, New Ways of Giving Non-
Whites the Business, CIVIL RIGHTS DIGEST, Spring
1969, at 13. To exemplify the seriousness of this
problem, it was once estimated that if the pop-
ulation density of some of Harlem's worst blocks
extended to all of New York City, the entire
ropulation of the United States could have fit
into three of New York's boroughs. Kaplan,
supra note 5, at 390 (citing REPORT OF THE
UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS
367 (1959)). Moreover, the ghetto economy
is isolated and unresponsive to the national
economy, as reflected by the absence of normal
flows of capital and credit and unemployment
rates. See BLACK CAPITALISM 35-36.
yond this, even where low-cost housing is
made available in white areas, the reluc-
tance of whites to stay for fear of diminish-
ing property values and the possibility of
becoming a minority in the area frustrates
attempts at integration.9 One possible solu-
tion to this problem lies in the utilization
of the "benevolent quota"-.e., the estab-
lishment of a fixed ratio between white and
Negro residents in a given area-to allevi-
ate fears of an "invasion" of large numbers
of Negroes and diminishing property values.
Without the adoption of some such affir-
mative measures, housing patterns will re-
main segregated, and, as a result, so will
many school districts, inasmuch as their
attendance zones are generally determined
geographically. 10 Segregated educational fa-
cilities in turn have several disadvantages.
To begin with, they may very well result
in serious psychological harm to the Negro
student, manifested by decreased motiva-
tion and various forms of antisocial be-
havior." Secondly, racially imbalanced
9 Fostering the development of integrated resi-
dential areas is an important and necessary step
toward achieving racial harmony and understand-
ing. Interracial contact reduces prejudice and re-
sults in more favorable attitudes on the part of
both races, and would probably be most success-
ful if it occurred on a continuous personal basis
rather than merely on a working or educational
basis. See Navasky, The Benevolent Housing
Quota, 6 How. L.J. 30, 36 (1960).
10 This is de facto or "fortuitous" segregation,
in contrast to de jure segregation where the
separation of races is due purposefully to legal
compulsion.
11 See Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public
Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARV.
L. REV. 564, 568 (1965). The Supreme Court
expressed its concern in the following manner:
To separate them from others of similar age
and qualifications solely because of their race
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schools are academically inadequate, at
least to the extent that students do not
receive the benefis to be derived from
exchanging ideas and developing personal
relationships in a racially and socially
heterogeneous atmosphere.12 Consequently,
segregated schools perpetuate social bar-
riers by impeding understanding between
the races and intensifying the inability to
communicate. 13 However, even where the
generates a feeling of inferiority as to their
status in the community that may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone.
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494
(1954). There may in fact be a significant corre-
lation between equal educational opportunity and
the commission of a disproportionate amount of
violent crimes-e.g., robbery, burglary, or loot-
ing-by Negroes. This is not to say that Negroes
commit more crimes, but merely to demonstrate
the significant distinction to be made between
these violent, property seeking crimes and "white
collar" crimes-e.g., embezzlement and tax fraud
-which require a somewhat more sophisticated
person. See Clark & Clark, Denial of Rights to
Black Citizens-A Speculation on the Relation
to Violence and Civil Disorders, 46 DENVER L.J.
63, 79-80 (1969); Morgenthau, Equal Justice
and the Problem of White Collar Crime, THE
CONFERENCE BOARD RECORD, Aug. 1969, at 20.
12 Resistance to integration on the ground that
it will lower the academic performance of white
students appears to be unfounded inasmuch as
there is social science evidence which does not
support such contentions. See Sullivan, Imple-
inenting Equal Educational Opportunity, 38
HARV. EDUC. REV. 148, 150-51 (1968). On the
other hand, experimental data indicates that un-
derprivileged children in middle-class schools
tend to perform at a higher level than they would
in lower class schools. Kaplan, supra note 5, at
400.
1-3 The educational function of the school is per-
haps more completely realized if it serves as
the great meeting place; few other social insti-
tuitions can so easily serve this purpose, espe-
cially when children of elementary school age
are involved. Segregation may give Negroes
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school system is integrated, the use of stan-
dardized tests to determine the level of
educational exposure to be given to each
child may discriminate against the Negro
because of the inherent disadvantage aris-
ing out of his pre-school exposure to an
underprivileged cultural milieu inasmuch
as such tests are generally geared to a
middle class cultural norm.1 4
Thus, failure to make corrections in each
of these areas increases the likelihood that
social mobility will be impeded-under- or
unemployment will prevent the Negro from
moving out of the slum, which will in turn
reduce the equal educational opportunities
of his children, who will in turn be un-
qualified for the better jobs and forced
to live in the ghetto where their children
will be deprived of equal educational op-
portunities which will confine them to the
poorer jobs, which in turn ....
Reconstruction-Up from Slavery?
Prior to the Civil War, Negroes were
considered to be neither citizens of the
states they inhabited nor citizens within the
meaning of the Constitution, and, conse-
quently, were not entitled to the personal
rights commensurate with such status.15
While President Lincoln's sole aim during
and whites the comfort that comes from avoid-
ing the daily confrontation of racial hostility,
but this simply perpetuates a circle that is
vicious and ultimately unworkable in a society
as interdependent as America's.
Fiss, supra note 11, at 570.
14 See, e.g., Note, Legal Implications of the Use
of Standardized Ability Tests in Employment and
Education, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 691, 701 (1968).
15 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.)
393 (1856).
the Civil War is contended to have been
preservation of the Union, and not the
abolition of slavery,', political pressures
forced the issuance of the Emancipation
Proclamation, 1'7 and slavery's fate was
thereafter clearly dependent upon the out-
come of the War. Following the Union
victory, the thirteenth amendment was
adopted to assure the permanent abolition
of slavery and to secure for the Negro
the personal rights denied thereby.' 8 The
16 See, e.g., Kohl, Civil Rights Act of 1866, Its
Hour Come Round at Last: Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co., 55 VA. L. REV. 272, 273 (1969).
17 12 Stat. 1268 (1863), providing in pertinent
part:
I do order and declare that all persons
held as slaves . . . are, and henceforward shall
be, free; and that the Executive Government
of the United States . . . will recognize and
maintain the freedom of said persons.
At this time, Congress had already abolished
slavery in the District of Columbia. Act of April
16, 1862, ch. 54, § 1, 12 Stat. 376.
18 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. The sponsors of
the amendment based their draft on the language
of article VI of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787,
1 U.S.C. xxxix (1964). Frank & Munro, The
Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of
the Laws," 50 COLUM. L. REV. 131, 138 (1950).
Section one's proscription of slavery and involun-
tary servitude-slavery in its narrowest and strict-
est sense-nullified the fugitive slave, art. IV, § 2,
cl. 3, and three-fifths, art. I, § 2, cl. 3, provisions
of the Constitution. Section two was intended to
empower Congress to enact legislation proscrib-
ing the "badges"-i.e., infringement of the Ne-
gro's natural rights through government failure
to protect them-and "incidents"-i.e., terroriza-
tion of friendly and sympathizing whites--of
slavery. See tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States, 39 CALIF.
L. REV. 171, 179-80 (1951). The potential scope
of such enabling power, inasmuch as it was
intended to reach private acts, threatened tradi-
tional concepts of federalism and was the pri-
mary target for opponents to passage of the
amendment. Id. at 179.
Southern states responded by enacting the
Black Codes, making it clear that enabling
legislation would be needed to implement
the ideal expressed in the thirteenth
amendment. 19
Among the proposals introduced in the
Thirty-ninth Congress was a civil rights
bill aimed at correcting the inequalities of
the Black Codes through nationalization of
the civil or natural rights of all persons. 20
Enacted as the Civil Rights Act of 1866, -21
its guarantee to "the full and equal benefit
of all laws" was intended to include pro-
19 The practical effect of this Southern legisla-
tion was to keep the Negro enslaved. Discrimina-
tions were either perpetuated or created in the
criminal law, and civil rights were severely re-
stricted. Frank & Munro, supra note 18, at 144.
For example, statutory provisions made labor
contracts specifically enforceable against freed-
men; they made it a misdemeanor for a Negro
to be without a long-term contract of employ-
ment, conviction to be followed by a fine payable
by a white man who could then have the crimi-
nal work for him until his generosity had been
repaid; they made minors subject to compulsory
apprenticeship laws. Id. The history of this brief
period reveals that private acts of discrimination
and terrorism were a prime source of trouble,
Kohl, supra note 16, at 278, for white sympa-
thizers as well as the Negro, Gressman, The
Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50
MIcH. L. REV. 1323, 1329-30 .(1952); tenBroek,
supra note 18, at 188.
20 tenBroek, supra note 18, at 187.
21 Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27,
providing in pertinent part:
citizens, of every race and color ... shall have
the same right, in every State and Territory in
the United States, to make and enforce con-
tracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence,
to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and con-
vey real and personal property, and to full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for
the security of person and property, as is en-
joyed by white citizens ....
Id. § 1 (emphasis added).
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tection from state inaction as well as state
action, thereby providing an opportunity
to reach private acts of discrimination.2 2
Federal court dispositions upholding the
Act's constitutionality 3 contrasted with un-
favorable dispositions in the state courts as
to the efficacy of the new legislation 2
4
clearly indicated the federalism controversy,
causing concern among the abolitionists as
to the longevity of the Act and prompting
plans to secure its provisions permanently.
25
Under these circumstances, the fourteenth
amendment was adopted, and it was in-
tended to incorporate the provisions and
implications of the 1866 Act. 2 6 The fram-
ers relied primarily on the privileges and
immunities clause 27 to secure the rights of
all citizens, 28 with the equal protection and
due process clauses considered to be of
secondary importance. 29 Subsequently, the
22 See, e.g., Gressman, supra note 19, at 1332;
Kohl, supra note 16, at 293; tenBroek, supra
note 18, at 188.
23 E.g., United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785,
794 (No. 16,151) (C.C.D. Ky. 1866); In re
Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337, 339 (No. 14,247)
(C.C.D. Md. 1867).
24 E.g., People v. Brady, 40 Cal. 198 (1870);
Bowlin v. Commonwealth, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 5
(1867).
25 Gressman, supra note 19, at 1328-29.
26 See, e.g., id. at 1329; Kohl, supra note 16,
at 293; tenBroek, supra note 18, at 200.
27 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See Gressman,
supra note 19, at 1333. Earlier, the "privileges
and immunities of citizens," U.S. CONST. art. IV,
§ 2, cl. 1, had been held to include all fundamen-
tal rights. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551
(No. 3230) (C.C.D. Pa. 1823).
28 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, also secured
Negro citizenship by providing that "[alll persons
born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens
of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside."
29 In fact, during the course of adoption, the
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Civil Rights Act of 1866 was reenacted to
assure that it would be protected under the
fourteenth amendment,30 and the Civil
Rights Act of 187531 was passed.
Thus, in a very brief period, abolitionist
legislators had revolutionized the concept
of federalism in order to secure the rights
of the country's new citizens. Unfortunately,
however, this shining moment in the Re-
construction Era was short-lived as the
Supreme Court, concerned with the grow-
ing centralization of federal power, refused
to construe the fourteenth amendment so
as to increase the federal sphere of in-
fluence. Initially, the Slaughter House
Cases32 emasculated the privileges and im-
munities clause by drawing a distinction
between national and state citizenship and
holding that only those rights inherent in
the relationship between the citizen and
the national government-which it stated
did not encompass an individual's fun-
damental rights-were protected by the
amendment. 33  Subsequently, the Civil
Rights Cases34 declared those sections of
the Civil Rights Act of 1875 aimed at
private acts of racial discrimination in pub-
lic accommodations to be an unconstitu-
tional exercise of legislative power, holding
due process clause was almost entirely ignored.
Frank & Munro, supra note 18, at 132, 141 &
n.45.
30 Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114,
§ 18, 16 Stat. 144.
31 Act of March 1, 1875, 18 Stat. 335, proscrib-
ing, inter alia, private racial discrimination in the
enjoyment of public accommodations. id. § 1.
Section two of the Act prescribed penalties for
violations of section one.
32 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
33 Id. at 73-79.
34 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
that Congress could only legislate to re-
dress wrongs resulting from affirmative
state action infringing the rights of its citi-
zens.3 5 Eventually, the thirteenth amend-
ment was restrictively interpreted to be
inapplicable to individual rights unrelated
to the institution of slavery.36 The result of
these decisions was to reinvest the states
with the responsibility of protecting civil
rights, a result which the legislators of the
post-Civil War era expressly sought to pre-
vent.
Although the atmosphere for segregation
was favorable, it was not until the close of
the nineteenth century that this institution
received the sanction of the Supreme Court
when it adopted the infamous "separate but
equal" doctrine in Plessy v. Ferguson .3 The
result was the enactment of a rash of stat-
utes in the Southern states requiring segre-
35 Id. at 13. Earlier cases pointed to this result.
See, e.g., Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318
(1879); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S.
(2 Otto) 542, 543, 554-55 (1876).
36 Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 16-17
(1906). In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court had
found the activities to be proscribed without the
ambit of "badges and incidents" of slavery which
could be prohibited by federal legislation enacted
pursuant to the thirteenth amendment.
37 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Earlier the Court had
rejected the "separate but equal" doctrine on
similar facts. Railroad Co. v. Brown, 84 U.S.
(17 Wall.) 445 (1873). Stating that laws per-
mitting or requiring segregation were within the
scope of the states' police power, the Court
pointed to the establishment of separate schools
as the most common example of its exercise.
163 U.S. at 544. However, it was quite some
time before the Court specifically considered the
separation of races in public schools and indi-
cated that a state might constitutionally require
separate facilities. See Gong Lum v. Rice, 275
U.S. 78, 87 (1927).
gation in public facilities. 38 This was to
have its most profound effect on the Negro's
educational opportunities, while the inabil-
ity of Congress to reach private acts of
discrimination was to have its most pro-
found effect on his employment and hous-
ing opportunities.39 Practically speaking,
freedom for the Negro meant the "oppor-
tunity" to work on a "hired last, paid less,
laid-off first" basis, and to live in a ghetto
and send his children to a Negro school.
Toward Freedom?
For nearly sixty years following the
Civil Rights Act of 1875, the plight of the
Negro was unaided by any significant civil
rights developments. The creation of the
Civil Rights Section of the Department of
Justice in 193940 was evidence of an aware-
ness that all was not well, if nothing else.41
Eventually, changes in the employment and
housing areas were initiated through execu-
tive and legislative action while judicial ac-
tion was the source of reform in the educa-
tional sphere. While developments in each
of these fields are somewhat interrelated,
progress in each area will be examined sep-
arately for the convenience of analysis.
38 Wright, Public School Desegregation: Legal
Remedies for De Facto Segregation, 40 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 285, 287 (1965).
39 The legality and enforceability of private ra-
cially restrictive covenants, Corrigan v. Buckley,
271 U.S. 323 (1926), had the effect of creating
segregated housing patterns. However, govern-
mental action aimed at achieving this effect was
proscribed. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60
(1917).
40 Order of the Att'y Gen. No. 3204, Feb. 3,
1939.
41 Concerned primarily with the enforcement of
criminal sanctions, the Section was not a large
one. See Gressman, supra note 19, at 1343.
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Employment
In 1941, the first fair employment prac-
tices commission was established by execu-
tive order, proscribing discrimination by
employers holding government contracts. 42
Since then, each president has availed him-
self of this mode of legislation to deal with
discriminatory employment practices, 43 but,
until recently, their effectiveness was min-
imal.44 Following the Government's lead,
42 Exec. Order No. 8802, 3 C.F.R. 957 (1938-
43 Comp.).
43 Exec. Order No. 9346, 3 C.F.R. 1280 (1938-
43 Comp.), expanded the scope of authority to
industries affecting the war effort. Exec. Order
No. 9980, 3 C.F.R. 720 (1943-48 Comp.), ex-
tended the proscription to federal employment.
Exec. Order No. 10308, 3 C.F.R. 837 (1949-53
Comp.) and Exec. Order No. 10479, 3 C.F.R.
961 (1949-53 Comp.), were directed at private
industry. Exec. Order No. 10925, 3 C.F.R. 448
(1959-63 Comp.), granted, for the first time,
authority to an executive agency to initiate com-
plaints against contractors and to withhold future
awards from guilty parties, and was supple-
mented by Exec. Order No. 11114, 3 C.F.R.
774 (1959-63 Comp.), which was directed at
construction trade unions deliberately keeping
Negroes in unskilled jobs. Exec. Order No.
11246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-65 Comp.), abolished
the President's Commission on Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity and assigned the Secretary of
Labor the task of administering the contract
compliance program, but preserved many of the
provisions of Exec. Order No. 10925.
44 The Office of Federal Contract Compliance
(OFCC), for example, created by Exec. Order
No. 11246 to supersede the President's Commis-
sion on Equal Employment Opportunity, has
taken steps to maintain a constant surveillance
over employment practices of federal contrac-
tors, and has begun to exert its influence without
having to wait for a complaint or to initiate a
complaint itself as the EEOC was required to do.
See notes 59 & 70 infra. Many of the earlier
executive agencies were even more restricted in
the scope of their powers than was the EEOC.
Another shortcoming of this method of dealing
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the states soon established similar commis-
sions.45 Unfortunately, however, the history
of fair employment practices legislation has
not been a successful one for several rea-
sons. In the first place, the neutral character
of antidiscrimination legislation is often in-
sufficient to overcome the inertia which
many years of discrimination has brought
about. 46 Secondly, in most states corrective
with the problem is that it typically provides
administrative relief only, and does not give the
aggrieved party a private right of action. See
Note, Legal Implications of the Use of Stan-
dardized Ability Tests in Employment and Edu-
cation, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 691, 720 (1968)
[hereinafter Standardized Ability Tests].
45 New York established the first fair employ-
ment practices commission in 1945. Ives-Quinn
Act, L. 1945, ch. 118, § 1 [1945] N.Y. Laws,
168th Sess. 456, as amended, N.Y. EXEC. LAW
§ 290 et seq. (McKinney Supp. 1970). Today,
about forty states have adopted fair employment
practices legislation. See Kovarsky, The Negro
and Fair Employment, 56 Ky. L.J. 757, 800
(1968); Lucas, Ending Discrimination: Positive
Approaches for Government, 15 CATHOLIC LAW.
189, 190 (1969). The constitutionality of the
New York Fair Employment Practices Law was
upheld in Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326
U.S. 88 (1945), when the Supreme Court re-
jected a union's argument that the fourteenth
amendment guaranteed its right to discrimina-
torily select its members. However, it has been
suggested that, as applied to personal service
occupations, there may be a conflict with the
thirteenth amendment's proscription of involun-
tary servitude. See Avins, Freedom of Choice in
Personal Service Occupations: Thirteenth A mend-
ment Limitations on Antidiscrimination Legisla-
tion, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 228 (1964). In answer
to the argument that freedom to go into another
line of work precludes involuntary servitude in
personal service occupations, it is pointed out
that inasmuch as the fourteenth amendment pro-
tects the right to earn a livelihood through any
lawful means, to force one to choose between
his thirteenth and fourteenth amendment rights
is unconstitutional. Id. at 246-47.
46 See, e.g., Kidder, Paths from Poverty to Em-
action must be initiated by a complainant
and not by the commission. Finally, when
coupled with the fact that the remedial
process is a relatively slow one, nearly al-
ways involving an attempt at conciliation,
many acts are never reported or never fol-
lowed up by those who already have an-
other job and are disinterested in the past
discrimination. 47
Passage of the Civil Rights Act of 196448
with its comprehensive provisions for equal
employment opportunities, 49 gave the Gov-
ernment a much more significant role in
ployment: Job Search Among Negroes, 19 LAB.
L.J. 482, 487 (1968); Spitz, Tailoring the Tech-
niques to Eliminate and Prevent Employment
Discrimination, 14 BUFFALO L. REV. 79 (1964).
As an illustration, active recruitment of qualified
Negroes may be required to overcome the image
that a previously racially discriminating em-
ployer may have made with the black commun-
ity, who no longer seek employment at his firm
because of the reputation that it has acquired,
or to overcome the Negroes' reluctance to per-
severe in the search for a job as a result of the
many unsuccessful attempts to secure employ-
ment in the past.
47 See Hill, supra note 7, at 33-34.
48 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000-2000h-6 (1964).
49 Id. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 [hereinafter title VIII.
Inasmuch as the Act was based upon the
commerce clause prior to the recent expan-
sion of the scope of the thirteenth and fourteenth
amendments, it applies to only those employers
in interstate commerce who employ twenty-five
or more. Other significant exclusions from the
compass of the Act are the United States and
its wholly owned corporations, state and local
governments, and educational institutions with
respect to employment of individuals to perform
work connected with the educational activities of
the institution. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1964).
It has been estimated that these exclusions leave
92 percent of the employers outside the Act's
coverage. See Comment, Racial Discrimination
in Employment Under the Civil Rights Act of
1866, 36 U. CHL L. REV. 615, 624 & n.42 (1969).
the employment area. In addition to pro-
scribing racial discrimination and segre-
gation by employers and labor organi-
zations,50 the Act takes cognizance of
standardized tests and seniority systems,
two areas where discrimination is more
subtle than an outright refusal by an em-
ployer to hire or by a union to admit a
Negro to membership. 51 Both play a sig-
nificant role in labor today,52 providing an
50 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000-e (a)&(c).
51 Id. § 2000e-2(h) provides that
it shall not be an unlawful employment prac-
tice for an employer to apply different stan-
dards of compensation, or different terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment pur-
suant to a bona fide seniority or merit system
... provided that such differences are not the
result of an intention to discriminate because
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,
nor shall it be an unlawful employment prac-
tice for an employer to give and to act upon
the results of any professionally developed
ability test provided that such test, its adminis-
tration or action upon the results is not de-
signed, intended or used to discriminate because
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
(Emphasis added.) Most state laws have no pro-
visions concerning testing. See Kovarsky, supra
note 45, at 813; Standardized Ability Tests at 722.
52 Employers rely on tests as a basis for hiring,
promoting, and assigning jobs. Cooper & Sobol,
Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment
Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria
of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1598,
1637 (1969). They can be used on a competitive
basis to seek the highest scorer, or they can be
used as a screening device to select those who
achieve a predetermined score for further con-
sideration. Id. One study indicated that there had
been an increase in the use of personnel tests
by the firms represented from 64 percent in 1958
to 84 percent in 1963. Standarized Ability Tests
at 696. With respect to seniority systems, their
use is widespread in significantly sized businesses
in which employees are organized, and generally
play some role in the determination of work
allocation. Cooper & Sobol, supra, at 1602 &
1604. It has been estimated that 90 per-
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opportunity for more sophisticated forms
of racial discrimination; 53 and their dis-
criminatory effects are somewhat interre-
lated insofar as testing is used in conjunc-
tion with seniority systems.
The most essential problem with respect
to standardized employment tests is that
Negroes and other disadvantaged groups
score substantially lower than whites on
general intelligence or aptitude tests be-
cause their inferior educational background
and culturally deprived environment create
inherent disadvantages. 54 This inequity is
compounded by the fact that "test score-job
performance" correlations are usually very
low 55-i.e., tests are invalid predictors of
cent of all employment contracts provide for
seniority. See 2 BNA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS 75:1 (1967).
53 Fifteen to twenty percent of all charges filed
under title VII involve a testing issue. Cooper &
Sobol, supra note 52, at 1637.
54 Id. at 1639; see also Standardized Ability Tests
at 701. Thus, the discrimination may even be
inadvertent where an employer is using standard
tests in good faith. To date, there has been no
scientifically proven correlation between race and
intelligence, and, although there is some contro-
versy, it is generally presumed that the inherent
ability of Negroes and whites is equal. See id.
at 695. Two possible corrective measures to this
problem are the development of "culture free"
tests, id. at 704, and the recognition of different
score levels for qualification, id. at 705.
55 Cooper & Sobol, supra note 2, at 1643; Stan-
dardized Ability Tests at 699-700. While it has
been suggested that a test which does not ac-
curately predict job performance is not neces-
sarily invalid with respect to equal employment
opportunity inasmuch as it affects whites and
Negroes alike, Cooper & Sobol, supra note 52,
at 1660, it is submitted that the burden will fall
most heavily on the Negro inasmuch as his gen-
erally inferior performance on such tests will re-
sult in a correspondingly smaller percentage of
Negroes achieving the test's qualification score,
DISCRIMINATION
job performance. While test validation is by
no means foolproof,5 6 making it a pre-
requisite to the use of any test would help
to alleviate intentional discrimination
through testing.57 In addition, the possibility
unless, of course, any of the corrective measures
discussed in note 54 supra have been taken. E.g.,
in Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 69 LRRM
2005 (E.D. La. 1968), applicants for all jobs, in-
cluding janitorial positions, were required to pass
a test battery which was shown to be valid for
only the top 8 percent of the jobs in the plant.
Naturally there would be a greater percentage of
whites capable of passing the test; but there would
most likely be an equal percentage of whites and
Negroes capable of performing a janitor's func-
tions.
56 See, e.g., Kovarsky, Some Social and Legal
Aspects of Testing Under the Civil Rights Act,
20 LAB. L.J. 346 (1969). Test validation is essen-
tially a two-step process involving, first, deter-
mination of the skills and personality traits
requisite for successful job performance and the
development of measures to accurately assess
these requirements, and, second, correlation of
test results to on-the-job performance. Stan-
dardized Ability Tests at 696-97. The problem
lies where the initial determination of requisites
for successful job performance contains irrele-
vant requirements, inasmuch as some who could
successfully perform the job will not make the
grade even though the test predicts accurately
among "qualifying" applicants. Id. at 698.
57 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion's Guidelines on Employment Testing Proce-
dures announced the Commission's interpretation
of title VII's reference to "professionally devel-
oped ability test," see note 51 supra, as one fairly
measuring the requisite knowledge or skill for a
particular job, or one fairly affording an em-
ployer a chance to measure the applicant's ability
to perform a particular job. See CCH EMPL.
PRAc. GUIDE 16,904 (1967). These guidelines
have been adopted by some courts, e.g., United
States v. H. K. Porter Co., 296 F. Supp. 40, 78
(N.D. Ala. 1968), and rejected by others, e.g.,
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 292 F. Supp. 243,
250 (M.D.N.C. 1968). In addition, it was sug-
gested that the tests be used as only one of the
of holding a union responsible for dis-
criminatory testing practices where, as the
elected bargaining agent, it agrees with an
employer to the use of an invalid or in-
herently discriminatory test might provide
aid in this direction.58 Growing concern, at
any rate, is evidenced by increasing federal
pressures in this area. 59
To the extent that tests are used in con-
junction with a seniority system to deter-
mine promotions, their invalidity is no less
an invidious means of discrimination. 60
However, aside from testing, improperly
administered seniority systems are pri-
marily repugnant to equal employment
opportunity insofar as they, like testing,
perpetuate the effects of previous discrimi-
natory practices by keeping Negroes con-
determinants in the selection process. See CCH
EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE 16,904 (1967).
58 See Kovarsky, supra note 45, at 814. Liability
would be predicated upon breach of the union's
duty to represent all members of the bargaining
unit fairly, whether or not they are members of
the union. This duty was first established under
the Railway Labor Act in Steele v. Louisville
N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944), and then under
the National Labor Relations Act in Wallace
Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944). Even if
the union did not actively encourage an employer
to use a discriminatory test, its inaction with
knowledge that one is being used may be action-
able. See Local 12, United Rubber Workers v.
NLRB, 368 F.2d 12, 18 (5th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967), reh'g denied, 389
U.S. 1060 (1968).
59 The OFCC, e.g., issued an order requiring
government contractors regularly using tests to
have evidence available to indicate the validity
of the tests with respect to their intended pur-
pose, except for tests used at the management,
technical, and professional levels. 33 Fed. Reg.
14,392 (1968).
60 See Cooper & Sobol, supra note 52, at 1648-
49 & 1656.
fined to low paying, undesirable jobs.6 '
Although seniority rights are not vested
property rights and can be altered, 62 where
the existing nondiscriminatory system is
related to a valid management function, the
benefits of which outweigh the inequities
of the perpetuated effects of previous dis-
crimination, it will be left undisturbed. 63 On
61 See id. at 1602-04; Gould, Seniority and the
Black Worker: Reflections on Quarles and Its Im-
plications, 47 TExAs L. REV. 1039, 1040 (1969).
Discussion will be confined to "competitive status
seniority," used to determine priorities among
employees for employment advantages like pro-
motion and job security, in contrast to "benefit
seniority," which is used without regard to the
status of other employers to determine eligibility
for fringe benefits. See Cooper & Sobol, supra
note 52, at 1601 n.I. Its measurement may be in
terms of total length of employment with the
employer, length of service within a particular
department, length of service in a line of progres-
sion of interrelated jobs, or length of service in
a particular job. Id. at 1602. An employer may
use different measures for different purposes; e.g.,
promotion may be governed by job seniority
within a line of progression while layoffs are
governed by employment seniority. Id. at n.4.
62 Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
63 See, e.g., Whitfield v. Local 2708, United
Steelworkers of America, 263 F.2d 546, cert.
denied, 360 U.S. 962 (1959), involving a system
of departmental seniority with two segregated
lines of progression in each department, the line
for whites consisting of the skilled, higher paying
jobs. The knowledge acquired in any given job
was necessary for efficient performance in the
next job in the line of progression, and the fact
that a Negro transferring from an advanced posi-
tion in the unskilled line would have to take a
pay cut did not render the system invalid, nor
did it entitle the Negro to begin at a position in
the skilled progression line at which the salary
was comparable to that of his former job.
United States v. H. K. Porter Co., 296 F. Supp.
40 (N.D. Ala. 1968), involved a similar situa-
tion in which the lines of progression were inte-
grated by using base wage rates as the determi-
nant for placement of jobs in the integrated
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the other hand, where the adverse racial
impact is not sufficiently justified, the sys-
tem will have to be changed.6
4
In addition to the progress being made
with respect to discrimination through test-
ing and seniority, the prospect of substantial
penetration of the traditional racial barriers
of unions may prove to be the most sig-
nificant achievement for the Negro. 65 Al-
line. Demands for unrestricted transfers-i.e.,
eligibility for all vacant jobs on the basis of total
employment or plant seniority-were rejected be-
cause the interrelation of jobs within each depart-
ment necessitated entrance at the initial position
and a gradual working up to the higher position.
Id. at 67. See also United States v. Hayes Int'l
Corp., 295 F. Supp. 803 (N.D. Ala. 1968).
64 See, e.g., Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 279
F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968), involving a sys-
tem of departmental seniority in which the de-
partments were segregated, with Negroes confined
to those departments with unskilled, lower pay-
ing jobs. Upon the integration of the depart-
ments, the court held that differences in seniority
resulting from past discrimination were invalid,
pointing out the fact that considerations present
in Whitfield-i.e., a close interrelation of skills
required for progressive jobs-were nonexistent
in the case before it. Id. at 518. United States v.
Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers,
282 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. La. 1968), concerning a
job seniority system, held that promotion on the
basis of job seniority was invalid where Negroes
were being permitted to hold jobs from which
they had theretofore been excluded. Id. at 44.
65 At present, Negroes are significantly repre-
sented only in industrial unions, in which they
generally hold jobs of low pay and skill, and the
"mud trades"--e.g., bricklaying-which are in-
creasingly avoided by white workers. What Un-
ions Are-And Are Not-Doing For Blacks,
TIME, Sept. 26, 1969, at 88. Their absence is
particularly conspicuous in the construction,
electrical, sheet-metal, and plumbing trades. Id.
In 1963, e.g., only 300 Negro electricians and
plumbers were reported employed throughout the
country. Kovarsky, supra note 45, at 800 n.206
(citing Hearings on Civil Rights Before Sub-
DISCRIMINATION
though for the past twenty years unions
have been legally obligated to represent
Negroes fairly when they are members of
the represented bargaining unit, 66 and to
refrain from racial discrimination in the
selection of members, 67 they have been
successful in excluding Negroes from mem-
bership68 and in preventing them from
obtaining jobs in their respective trades. 9
However, recent legislative and executive
developments 7° and decisional law71 evince
comm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1799 (1963)).
06 See note 58 and accompanying text supra.
67 Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88
(1945). This position was codified in title VII.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1964).
68 Rigid control of apprenticeship programs,
often making use of invalid qualification tests,
has been the primary device for achieving this
goal. TIME, supra note 65, at 88. The proscrip-
tion against discriminatory testing in title VII
applies only to employers. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(h) (1964). See note 51 supra.
69 Initially achieved through the closed shop, the
Taft-Hartley Act's outlawing of that discrimina-
tory device has left exclusive hiring hall or refer-
ral arrangements as the major troublespot. See
Sovern, The National Jfabor Relations Act and
Racial Discrimination, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 563,
567 (1962). Under such contractual arrange-
ments, contractors are bound to seek workers in
a given trade through the union.
70 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) (1964) prohibits dis-
crimination in training programs. Active encour-
agement of full participation by Negroes in such
programs may be required to make this provision
effective. See Kovarsky, supra note 45, at 815;
see also Blumrosen, The Duty of Fair Recruit-
ment under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 22
RUTGERS L. REv. 465 (1968). The OFCC has
issued guidelines specifying integration goals to
be met in various trades by bidders for Gov-
ernment contracts for the Philadelphia area, and
is considering similar programs for other cities.
See Guidelines on Order Amending Philadelphia
Plan Relating to Minority Group Employment
Goals, LRX, Sept. 29, 1969 (Supp. No. 270).
71 See, e.g., Local 53, Int'l Ass'n of Heat &
a dogged determination to correct this situa-
tion.
Housing
Federal assistance in the provision of
low-income housing initiated reform in this
area in 1937.72 Thereafter, the judiciary's
proscription of judicial enforcement of ra-
cially restrictive covenants 73 and of racial
discrimination in the admission of appli-
cants to low-cost housing projects74 con-
tinued the movement. And in 1962 the
executive branch indicated its determina-
Frost Insulators v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th
Cir. 1969), involving a union with membership
requirements tending to restrict admission to
close relatives and friends of existing members.
Since the union had had a history of racial dis-
crimination, the requirements were held to be
invalid because they would perpetuate that dis-
crimination. The court ordered the development
of objective, trade-related membership criteria
and procedures. Id. at 1053. In Etheridge v.
Rhodes, 268 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. Ohio 1967), the
state was enjoined from entering into a contract
with a construction union that discriminated
against Negro membership inasmuch as it would
be aiding thereby in the deprivation of Negro
employment opportunity.
72 Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-30
(1964).
73 Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), held
that judicial enforcement of racially restrictive
covenants was state action within the scope of
the fourteenth amendment. Hurd v. Hodge, 334
U.S. 24 (1948), held judicial enforcement of
these covenants by federal courts of the District
of Columbia to be violative of 42 U.S.C. § 1982
(1964), guaranteeing all citizens equal rights in
transactions involving real and personal property.
In addition, it was subsequently held that a state
court's awarding of damages for breach of a
restrictive covenant would also be violative of
the equal protection clause. Barrows v. Jackson,
346 U.S. 249 (1953).
74 Jones v. City of Hamtramck, 121 F. Supp.
123 (E.D. Mich. 1954).
tion to improve conditions. 75 However, it
was not until 1968, with the passage of the
Civil Rights Act7" and the decision of
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,77 that pros-
pects for the eventual elimination of all
racial discrimination in housing appeared. 78
Essentially, Congress' fair housing legis-
lation prohibits discrimination in transac-
75 Exec. Order No. 11063, 3 C.F.R. 652 (1959-
63 Comp.), proscribed racial discrimination in
federally-assisted housing.
76 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (Supp. IV 1969) [here-
inafter title VIII].
77 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
78 At the state level, only twenty-eight states
have legislation prohibiting racial discrimination
in housing. Lucas, supra note 45, at 190. How-
ever, such legislation has been the subject of
repeated judicial inquiry. See, e.g., Reitman v.
Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), in which the pas-
sage of an amendment to a state constitution was
held unconstitutional insofar as it provided that
the state could not interfere with an individual's
right to absolute discretion in the choice of per-
sons with whom to enter into transactions involv-
ing real property. Inasmuch as the amendment
would have repealed two statutes prohibiting
racial discrimination in these transactions, the
practical effect of the amendment was to author-
ize private racial discrimination, thereby violat-
ing the equal protection clause. Similarly, an
amendment to a city charter in Hunter v. Erick-
son, 393 U.S. 385 (1969), providing that ap-
proval by popular vote was required for any
enactment regulating the control and disposition
of real property and, in effect, rendering the
state's fair housing law nugatory, was declared
unconstitutional. It was held to discriminate
against minorities by making it more difficult for
them to secure legislation on their behalf concern-
ing racial housing matters. Id. at 390-91. Likewise,
in Holmes v. Leadbetter, 294 F. Supp. 991 (E.D.
Mich. 1968), and Ranjel v. Lansing, 293 F. Supp.
301 (W.D. Mich. 1968), an attempt to put fair
housing legislation to a referendum was enjoined
inasmuch as it would involve the state in private
racial discrimination to an "unconstitutional de-
gree." But see Spaulding v. Blair, 403 F.2d 862
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tions involving residential property,79 with
several exemptions.80 It applies to the
owner of such property,8l those who make
commercial real estate loans, 82 and those
who provide brokerage services.83 Cover-
age is estimated to include between 75 and
85 percent of the nation's housing supply.8 4
In contrast, the decision in Jones resur-
rected legislation that lay dormant for many
years85 and construed it to proscribe, as a
(4th Cir. 1968), in which the subjection of fair
housing legislation to a referendum was upheld.
Emphasis was placed on the fact that the referen-
dum procedure was an integral part of the state's
legislative process. Thus, rejection of the provi-
sions passed by the state legislature through a
referendum would not be tantamount to a repeal
of an existing law inasmuch as the provisions
had never become effective, being dependent
upon the referendum for that purpose.
79 See 42 U.S.C. § 3602(b) (Supp. IV 1969).
80 The sale or rental of single-family housing is
without the scope of the Act if the resident home-
owner does not own three such single-family
houses at any one time, and if he does not make
use of sales or rental facilities or sales or rental
services of a real estate broker, agent, or sales-
man. Id. § 3603(b)(I). I n addition, the Act does
not apply to "rooms or units in dwellings con-
taining living quarters occupied or intended to
be occupied by no more than four families living
independently of each other, if the owner actually
maintains and occupies one of such living quar-
ters as his residence." Id. § 3603(b) (2).
81 Id. § 3604. Religious organizations and pri-
vate clubs, however, are exempt. Id. § 3607.
82 Id. § 3605.
83 Id. § 3606.
84 See Smedley, A Comparative Analysis of Title
VIII and Section 1982, 22 VAND. L. REV. 459,
467 (1969).
85 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1964), derived from sec-
tion one of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, cf.
note 21 supra, and provides that "[a]ll citizens of
the United States shall have the same right, in
every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white
citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold, and convey real and personal property."
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valid exercise of the enabling power of the
thirteenth amendment, all racial discrimina-
tion in the sale or rental of any property. 86
Thus, title VIII encompasses a broader
range of discriminatory conduct and reaches
beyond the owner, seller, or lessor, while
section 1982 appears to focus on the spe-
cific property transactions by which owner-
ship, possession, and use thereof are ob-
tained. However, section 1982 is broader
in its transactional application since it ap-
plies to all citizens without exception. The
resolution of conflicts between these legis-
lative enactments will have to await future
determination,8 7 as will the full implications
of Jones.8s
86 "... § 1982 bars all racial discrimination,
private as well as public, in the sale or rental
of property .. " 392 U.S. at 413. In so finding,
the Court cited with approval the view stated in
the Civil Rights Cases with respect to the enabling
clause of the thirteenth amendment, which it said
empowered Congress to pass " 'all laws necessary
and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents
of slavery . ..' Id. at 439. (Emphasis added by
Jones Court, quoting from 109 U.S. at 20.)
See Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 1 R.R.L.S.
131 (S.D. Miss. 1969) (enjoining refusal to
sell building lot to Negro solely because of
his race); Jones v. Sciacia, 297 F. Supp. 165
(E.D. Mo. 1969) (involving racial discrimina-
tion in apartment rental). Section 1982 has also
provided the basis for an action where white
tenants were evicted from their apartment be-
cause they had had Negro guests. Walker v.
Pointer, 304 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Tex. 1969).
87 See, e.g., Bush v. Kaim, 297 F. Supp. 151
(N.D. Ohio 1969), holding that exemptions un-
der title VIII were not applicable to litigation
under section 1982. Cf. Berback v. Mangum, 59
Misc. 2d 41, 297 N.Y.S.2d 853 (Sup. Ct.
Monroe County 1969), involving New York
Executive Law § 296(5)(a), which contains
exemptions for owner-occupied dwellings simi-
lar to those of title VIII. The exemptions were
challenged as violative of the thirteenth and
fourteenth amendments in view of the con-
Despite the fact that these two enact-
ments remove many of the racial barriers
in the housing area, the crucial problem
has yet to be solved-i.e., the elimination
of segregated housing patterns and their
pernicious effects.8 9 In an effort to alleviate
struction given to section 1982 in Jones, but the
court upheld the constitutionality of the exemp-
tions, quoting with approval from the Supreme
Court's opinion in Jones:
Thus, although § 1982 contains none of the
exemptions that Congress included in the Civil
Rights Act of 1968, it would be a serious mis-
take to suppose that § 1982 in any way dimin-
ishes the significance of the law recently passed
by Congress. (Italics supplied). (Footnotes
omitted).
Id. at 47, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 860.
88 The decision may very well have an impact
in the employment area if 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1964) is revitalized in the same fashion as
was section 1982. Although the derivation of
section 1982 is often cited as section 16 of the
Enforcement Act of 1870, it originated in the
Civil Rights Act of 1866. See Comment, supra
note 49, at 619-20 (1969). Compare the lan-
guage of the section with that quoted from
the 1866 Act in note 21 supra. Section 1981
provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]ll persons
within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right in every State and Ter-
ritory to make and enforce contracts . . . as is
enjoyed by white citizens .... ." Inasmuch as
employment is a contractual arrangement, this
section could reach all acts of employment dis-
crimination in hiring. In fact, while the civil
rights bill was before Congress during the Re-
construction Era, the employment contract was
specifically referred to and discussed. Comment,
supra note 49, at 619 & n.19. Applied in this
manner, it could fill the gaps in title VII, see
note 49 supra, just as section 1982 does with
title VIII. There has already been one decision
treating section 1981 as a fair employment
law. Dobbins v. Local 212, Int'l Bhd. Elec.
Workers, 292 F. Supp. 413, 442 (S.D. Ohio
1968).
89 This has a significant impact on both educa-
tion, see notes 112-119 and accompanying text
infra, and employment, see note 8 supra.
the problem, the Department of Housing
and Urban Development has begun to sub-
sidize low-rent housing in cities with ghetto
problems, provided the site for the project
is in a nonghetto area.90 Problems arise
where desirable sites are in areas zoned for
single-family residences and the like, but
refusal to rezone such an area solely on
the basis of racial considerations-e.g.,
reluctance to have a significant number of
Negroes move into the area-has been held
unconstitutional as violative of both the
90 As was pointed out by the court in Hicks v.
Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619, 622 (E.D. La. 1969),
The Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment (HUD) has indicated that title VI of the
1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-
2000d-4 (1964), prohibits construction of feder-
ally-financed public housing in all-Negro neigh-
borhoods in the absence of a clear showing that
no other acceptable sites are available:
"The aim of a Legal Authority in carrying
out its responsibility for site selection should
be to select from among sites which are
acceptable under the other criteria of this
Section those which will afford the greatest
opportunity for inclusion of eligible applicants
of all groups regardless of race, color, creed,
or national origin, thereby affording members
of minority groups an opportunity to locate
outside of areas of concentration of their own
minority group. Any proposal to locate hous-
ing only in areas of racial concentration will
be prima facie unacceptable and will be re-
turned to the Local Authority for further
consideration and submission of either (1)
alternative or additional sites in other areas
so as to provide more balanced distribution
of the proposed housing or (2) a clear show-
ing, factually substantial, that no acceptable
sites are available outside the areas of racial
concentration." (emphasis added) Low-Rent
Housing Manual, § 205.1 4(g), (February
1967 Revision).
See also Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Author-
ity, 304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
91 Ranjel v. City of Lansing, 293 F. Supp. 301
(W.D. Mich. 1969).
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thirteenth 1 and fourteenth 92 amendments.
Nonetheless, critical housing shortages
compounded by inefficiencies of the con-
struction industry,9 3 which are, in turn, due
in part to outmoded building codes,9 4 pre-
vents progress at a desirable pace. More-
over, even though improved conditions may
provide the Negro with somewhat more
mobility and the cities may be successful in
constructing low-rent housing in nonghetto
areas in order to maximize the opportunity
for integration, the underlying problem still
remains-the people of the community.
Unfortunately, attempts at integration in
housing are plagued by what is termed the
"invasion-succession sequence."9 5 As Ne-
groes move into an area, white families
tend to move out, the rate of white depar-
ture accelerating as the percentage of Ne-
groes in the area increases.9 6 At some
92 Id.; Daly v. City of Lawton, 296 F. Supp.
266 (W.D. Okla. 1969).
93 One proposal for overcoming this shortage
is HUD's Operation Breakthrough, a plan which
calls for the development of a housing industry
through the use of mass production techniques.
See Huxtable, Assembly Line for that Dream
House, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1970, § 4, at 3,
col. 6.
94 Not only are the building codes outdated,
thereby preventing the use, in some instances,
of new materials, but there are also more than
5,000 different building codes throughout the
country, thereby making it impossible to make
use of standardized equipment and techniques.
See Peter, Housing: From Crisis to Disaster?,
LoOK, Feb. 10, 1970, at 53.
95 See Hellerstein, The Benign Quota, Equal
Protection and "The Rule in Shelley's Case,"
17 RUTGERS L. REv. 531, 533 (1963).
96 The process is hastened by the fact that
whites, because of color differences, tend to
overestimate the number of nonwhites living in
a neighborhood by three times the actual num-
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point-the "tipping point"9 7  the remain-
ing white families, fearful that a Negro "in-
vasion" is imminent, 98 depart at a greatly
accelerated rate, making the ensuing "in-
vasion" possible. As an expedient, piece-
meal device to achieve integration, the
benign quota 99 has proven successful. 100
However, successful widespread use of this
device is questionable in view of the
decision in Shelley v. Kraemer.10 1
ber. Navasky, The Benevolent Housing Quota,
6 How. L.J. 30, 36 (1960).
97 Tipping points vary according to the inten-
sity of a community's prejudicial feeling and
the surrounding area's racial composition. Hel-
lerstein, supra note 95, at 534.
98 The practice of "block-busting"--i.e., exploi-
tation of a community's fears of decreasing
property values because of the presence of
Negroes in the neighborhood by real estate
brokers in order to induce a rapid turnover in
the sale of houses, thereby increasing commis-
sions-is proscribed by title VIII. 42 U.S.C.
§ 3604(e) (Supp. IV 1969). The constitutionality
of this provision has been upheld in United States
v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305 (D. Md. 1969).
99 A maximum limit, just below the tipping
point, on the number of Negroes permitted to
move into a given area. The variety of intan-
gible factors that determine the tipping point of
a particular area create administrative prob-
lems in their establishment and in determining
whether or not they are being abused. See
Kaplan, supra note 5, at 393.
100 Navasky, supra note 96, at 37.
101 334 U.S. 1 (1948). See, e.g., Progress Dev.
Corp. v. Mitchell, 182 F. Supp. 681 (N.D. ill.
1960), rev'd on other grounds, 286 F.2d 222
(7th Cir. 1961), involving a land developer who
was planning to maintain a four-to-one ratio of
whites to Negroes in his development through
the use of separately executed, unrecorded resale
agreements giving him the right to select a pur-
chaser for the property in the event of a resale
of the premises. The court held that the dis-
criminatory restrictions, even though aimed at
controlled integration, could not be judicially
enforced. Id. at 707. The court also pointed
out that such a quota would be a "straitjacket,"
Education
The seeds of the collapse of de jure
school segregation were sown at about the
same time that reform was beginning in
the employment and housing areas. 10 2 Sub-
sequent developments began to erode the
"separate but equal" doctrine as applied to
education,10 3 culminating in its outright
rejection in the decision of Brown v. Board
of Education'0 4 (Brown I). However, a
year later, the decree in Brown v. Board of
Education105 (Brown II), implementing the
desegregation decision was qualified with
freezing integration efforts at levels that would
remain after they had outlived their usefulness
and impeding further natural integration.
102 In 1938, the Supreme Court declared a state
statute providing for the payment of Negro
tuition fees for attendance at an out-of-state law
school, pending the provision of separate legal
educational facilities for Negroes within the
state, to be violative of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Although the Court did not disturb the
"separate but equal" doctrine, it held that as
long as there were facilities for whites within
the state, the state was bound to provide Ne-
groes with comparable facilities within the state
immediately. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada,
305 U.S. 337 (1938).
103 In 1948, the Court specifically compelled
the admission of Negroes to a state's legal in-
stitutions absent similar facilities for Negroes
only. Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631
(1948). Subsequent decisions in McLaurin v.
Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950),
and Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950),
pointed more in the direction of Brown I inso-
far as they expressed concern for the quality
of a racially segregated education.
104 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In proscribing de jure
segregation, the Court declared separate educa-
tional facilities to be "inherently unequal." Id.
at 495. In the companion case of Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), the Court held
segregated public education in the District of
Columbia to be violative of the fifth amend-
ment's due process guarantee.
105 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
the infamous "all deliberate speed" require-
ment.10 6 Taking advantage of the leeway
given them, Southern states lost no time in
initiating plans designed to destroy the effi-
cacy of Brown I. These were facilitated by
restrictive interpretations of the holding in
Brown I and the permissible scope of the
fourteenth amendment.107 As racially in-
vidious schemes were struck down, new
ones were devised to take their place.
Initially, laws were passed in many states
to provide for the reassignment of pupils,
purportedly with a view to desegregation,10 8
Where there were no standards provided in
the laws to guide school officials in exer-
cising their discretion, they were held to be
unconstitutional as impliedly having race
as the standard of assignment.'0 9 Other-
106 Id. at 301. The district courts were to in-
sure good faith compliance with the new con-
stitutional mandate. Id. at 299. Although they
did not bind the courts, the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare issued guide-
lines adopted by most courts in evaluating
school desegregation plans. See 45 C.F.R. 118.13
(1967). The "all deliberate speed" requirement
was early held inapplicable to students at the
graduate or professional school level, Florida
ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, 350 U.S.
413 (1956) (per curiam), and subsequently at
the college, Meredith v. Fair, 305 F.2d 343
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 828 (1962),
and high school levels, Rogers v. Paul, 382 U.S.
198 (1965), where time was of the essence.
107 Several decisions held that integration was
not required. As long as there was no govern-
mentally enforced segregation in a desegregation
plan, it mattered not that the school systems
retained, for all practical effect, their dual
character. See, e.g., Borders v. Rippy, 247 F.2d
268 (5th Cir. 1957); Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F.
Supp. 776 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
108 See generally Meador, The Constitution and
the Assignment of Pupils to Public Schools, 45
VA. L. REV. 517 (1959).
109 See, e.g., Orleans Parish Sch. Bd. v. Bush,
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wise, standards provided which were prima
facie constitutional were judged according
to the manner in which they were applied
if challenged.' 10 Moreover, attempts to
thwart desegregation by closing public
schools were declared unconstitutional also
where state support was given to the pur-
portedly private schools. 11 In addition,
transfer plans allowing students upon re-
quest to transfer to a school for the purpose
of being in a racial majority were likewise
proscribed. 112 While previous discrimina-
tory practices were, for the most part, short-
lived, the freedom-of-choice plan, which
removed state involvement from the deseg-
regation scheme by providing, essentially,
that all students were to be permitted to
attend the school of their own choosing,
proved to be the most ingenious device de-
vised to perpetuate dual school systems.
With the aid of this device, de jure school
segregation was kept intact for more than
a decade after the decision of Brown 1.
Unable to tolerate the conspicuous ab-
sence of any significant advancement to-
ward the goal of unitary school systems
under the timid, initial approach of Brown
//, the Fifth Circuit 13 decreed that the
242 F.2d 156 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S
921 (1957).
110 See, e.g., Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d 724
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 910 (1957).
111 Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218
(1964); Hall v. St. Helena Parish Sch. Bd.,
287 F.2d 376 (5th Cir.), affd per curiam, 368
U.S. 515 (1962).
112 Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683
(1963).
113 The Fifth Circuit includes Alabama, Mis-
sissippi, Louisiana, and Georgia, which, in addi-
tion to South Carolina, have been the most
stubborn in resisting desegregation. See 'Yes
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fourteenth amendment, as construed in
Brown I, required integration of students,
faculties, facilities, and activities,1 4 im-
posing an affirmative duty on school
administrators to take corrective action
toward the goal of one integrated school
system." 5 This position was substantially
Virginia, There Is A Constitution,' NEWSWEEK,
Nov. 10, 1969, at 37.
114 United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of
Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 846 (1966), afl'd en banc
on reh'g, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 840 (1967).
115 Id. at 869. In setting up a guideline the
court made its position unmistakable: "The
only school desegregation plan that meets con-
stitutional standards is one that works." Id. at
847. Freedom-of-choice plans were held to be
unacceptable where freedom was illusory, id.
at 889-i.e., e.g., where overcrowded schools
prevented admission, or where lack of sufficient
transportation, or lack of integrated faculties and
administrative personnel discouraged seeking ad-
mission in another school. See, e.g., Betts v.
County Sch. Bd., 269 F. Supp. 593, 601 (W.D.
Va. 1967). Prior to Jefferson, the Supreie Court
had decreed that the impact of faculty alloca-
tion was to be taken into account in determining
the validity of a desegregation plan. Bradley v.
School Bd., 382 U.S. 103 (1965). Today, cir-
cumstances may even dictate a judicial decree
ordering faculty desegregation to approach a
goal in which the ratio of white to Negro
faculty members is substantially the same in
each school as it is throughout the system. See
United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of
Educ., 395 U.S. 225 (1969).
A related problem arising out of closing
down formerly Negro schools in moving toward
a unitary school system concerns employment
problems resulting from reduced job availability.
Generally, it has been held that jobs be filled
according to objective qualification standards,
irrespective of race. See, e.g., Rolfe v. County
Bd. of Educ., 391 F.2d 77 (6th Cir. 1968);
Wall v. Stanly County Bd. of Educ., 378 F.2d
275 (4th Cir. 1967). This procedure was in-
sisted upon even where a school board had a
previously established policy of dismissing teach-
adopted as the law of the land in Green v.
County School Board."6 Most recently, the
Court has reaffirmed its position with re-
spect to desegregation in Alexander v.
Holmes County Board of Education.117 Re-
jecting the Justice Department's plea on
behalf of several Mississippi school districts
for more time to implement desegregation
plans, the Court denounced "all deliberate
speed" as no longer constitutionally per-
missible, establishing the principle that
henceforth all pleas for exceptions to de-
segregation may be made only after inte-
gration is an established fact.""
Nevertheless, an affirmative duty to elim-
inate de facto school segregation has not
yet been imposed on school administrators
by the Supreme Court. 19 While there are
ers from closed schools. Smith v. Board of
Educ., 365 F.2d 770 (8th Cir. 1966).
116 391 U.S. 430 (1968). And in Monroe v.
Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450 (1968), the
Court held a desegregationally ineffective free
transfer plan to be unconstitutional.
117 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
11s At the time of the decision, fifteen years
after the decision in Brown I, only 464 of the
South's 1,129 school districts were operating
under unitary systems. 'Yes Virginia, There Is A
Constitution,' NEWSWEEK, Nov. 10, 1969, at 36.
119 Title IV of the 1964 Civil Rights Act de-
fined desegregation to exclude "the assignment
of students to public schools in order to over-
come racial imbalance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000c (b)
(1964). However, this has been held not to
prohibit plans to correct racial imbalance. See,
e.g., Olson v. Board of Educ., 250 F. Supp.
1000 (E.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 367 F.2d
565 (2d Cir. 1966); Addabbo v. Donovan, 16
N.Y.2d 619, 209 N.E.2d 112, 261 N.Y.S.2d 68,
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 905 (1965).
At least one state has enacted legislation re-
quiring affirmative action to alleviate racial
imbalance. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 71,
§§ 37C, 37D (Supp. 1967), which provides for
the withholding of state subsidies should local
distinct advantages to school assignments
based upon geographical zoning, 120 alterna-
tive plans121 must be given serious consid-
school authorities fail to keep nonwhite pupil
concentrations below the 50 percent level. The
statute has survived a constitutional challenge
in the state's highest court. School Comm. v.
Board of Educ., 352 Mass. 693, 227 N.E.2d
729 (1967). For an informative discussion on
the legislative problems involving de facto school
segregation, see Bolner, Legislative Problems
Surrounding Racially Balanced Public Schools:
A Critical Examination of the Responses and
the Prospects, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1253 (1969).
120 For one thing, it avoids the costs, incon-
veniences, and hazards of daily transportation,
and facilitates parent participation in parent-
teacher associations. Fiss, supra note 11, at 566.
Secondly, it enables parents to control their
children's associations in the public schools
through choice of residence-a somewhat mean-
ingless choice for most Negroes who lack the
ability to exercise a relatively free choice over
residence. Id. at 566-67. Associational objections
by whites to imbalanced schools are based, for
the most part, on socio-economic class dis-
parities rather than color. Id.
121 Three plans which would seem to offer the
most promise in terms of effectiveness and con-
venience are strategic site selection for new
schools, adoption of the Princeton Plan, and
redrawing geographic zones to cut across ra-
cially segregated areas. Under the first, new
schools would be built on the border of ghetto
areas rather than within them, so as to draw
students from both the ghetto and nonghetto
areas. Id. at 571-73. While it has been held
that a school board has a responsibility to plan
school construction so as not to inhibit inte-
tegration, Wheeler v. Durham City Bd. of Educ.,
346 F.2d 768, 774 (4th Cir. 1965); United
States v. School Dist. 151, 286 F. Supp. 786
(N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 404 F.2d 1125 (7th Cir.
1968), it has also been held, in earlier cases,
that a school board may choose to construct a
school in an area that results in its being ra-
cially imbalanced. See, e.g., Beckett v. School
Bd., 269 F. Supp. 118, 135 (W.D. Va. 1967);
Henry v. Godsell, 165 F. Supp. 87, 90 (E.D.
Mich. 1958). The Princeton Plan would com-
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eration when such zoning results in racially
imbalanced schools. 122 Refusal to require
or permit correction of racial imbalance on
the ground that there is no constitutional
mandate to do so,123 is unacceptable inas-
much as it confuses the real issue-i.e.,
whether or not there is a constitutional duty
to provide everyone with an equal educa-
tional opportunity. 2 4 And if the real issue
is equal educational opportunity, constitu-
tional considerations should be the same
whether applied to de jure or de facto
segregation. 125 Nonetheless, a problem sim-
bine two racially diverse schools with contiguous
district lines and have each school teach specific
grades exclusively, thereby having all students
of any particular grade in the same school.
See Wright, supra note 38, at 304. Rezoning
school districts to take racial imbalance into
account, perhaps the easiest to implement of
the three methods, has been held not to violate
a state law providing that race was not to be
taken -into account in considering admission to
schools. Balaban v. Rubin, 14 N.Y.2d 193, 199
N.E.2d 375, 250 N.Y.S.2d 281, cert. denied,
379 U.S. 881 (1964).
122 The Fifth Circuit, dealing with a situation
resulting from de jure segregation, has already
held geographical zoning to be acceptable only
if it tends to establish a unitary school system.
United States v. Greenwood Mun. Separate Sch.
Dist., 406 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir. 1968); accord,
United States v. Indianola Mun. Separate Sch.
Dist., 410 F.2d 626, 629 (5th Cir. 1969);
Henry v. Clarkesdale Mun. Separate Sch. Dist.,
409 F.2d 682, 683 (5th Cir. 1969).
123 See, e.g., Deal v. Board of Educ., 369 F.2d
55 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 847 (1966);
Bell v. School City, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir.
1963).
124 See Barksdale v. Springfield Sch. Comm.,
237 F. Supp. 543, 546 (D. Mass. 1965).
125 De jure school segregation includes gerry-
mandering of attendance zones pursuant to
racial considerations. See United States v. Jef-
ferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 876
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ilar to that encountered in the housing
area-i.e., departure of whites after arrival
of Negroes-is also present here. 1 26
(5th Cir. 1966); Taylor v. Board of Educ., 294
F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940
(1961); Clemons v. Board of Educ., 228 F.2d
853 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1006
(1956). In Blocker v. Board of Educ., 226 F.
Supp. 208, 226, remedy considered on reh'g,
229 F. Supp. 709 (E.D.N.Y. 1964), the court
found that a school board's failure to alleviate
racial imbalance in a compulsory public educa-
tional system constituted state imposed segrega-
tion.
126 See Kaplan, supra note 5, at 400. In fact,
schools will change from white to Negro more
quickly than a neighborhood. Id. The immediate
reaction in Mississippi to the Supreme Court's
decision in Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of
Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969), would seem to
attest to this. Response to the reaffirmation of
the nation's policy included threats of cutting
off public funds to the public schools and
construction of private schools to accommodate
those who did not want to attend integrated
schools. See Reed, Full Integration Worries and
Angers Mississippi, New York Times, Nov. 24,
1969, at 1, col. 2. Fortunately, such drastic
measures have not been taken, as activities in-
dicate a more favorable response to the Supreme
Court's unyielding position on this issue. See
Speeding Desegregation, TIME, Jan. 26, 1970, at
14; The End of an Era, TIME, Jan. 19, 1970,
at 14.
However, assuming the threatened response
occurred, giving 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1964) the
expansive interpretation it is capable of under
Jones, see note 88 supra, would be an effective
means of thwarting such circumvention of the
intended effects of the decision inasmuch as
failure to admit Negroes to private schools on
racial grounds would be a prohibited denial of
their right to contract freely. Indeed, it has al-
ready been suggested that the role which edu-
cation plays in national life may preclude there
being any such thing as private education. See
Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ.,
203 F. Supp. 855, 858-59 (E.D. La. 1962).
An alternative means to prevent such an
occurrence is to use benevolent quotas to assure
Even if integrated schools are achieved,12 7
some of the most fundamental concepts un-
derlying our educational system may need
revamping to make the job complete. In-
sofar as standardized testing plays a role
in determining a child's level of educational
exposure, environmental disadvantages may
be perpetuated. 28 Although educational
tests are substantially better predictors than
are employment tests,'1 20 the Negro's in-
herent disadvantage on such a test may ac-
tually make the tests a "self-fulfilling proph-
ecy,"' '1 and the result may well be critical
in terms of future job opportunities. 13 1
parents, initially, that a school will not become
predominantly attended by those in the lower
socio-economic strata. See Kaplan, supra note
5, at 398 & 400.
127 And there is not complete agreement that
this should be our goal. See generally, e.g.,
Kurland, Equal Educational Opportunity: The
Limits of Constitutional Jurisprudence Unde-
fined, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 583 (1968).
128 It has been estimated that 75 to 90 percent
of the public school systems in the United
States use standardized tests at least once be-
tween the first and twelfth grades. See Standard-
ized Ability Tests at 736 (citing D. GOSLIN, THE
SEARCH FOR ABILITY 57 (1963)). Generally, they
provide the basis for what is called the "track
system" of education, in which children of com-
parable ability, according to the tests, are
grouped together and taught at a level com-
mensurate therewith. See generally Hobson v.
Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 442-92 (D.D.C.
1967), aIJ'd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408
F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969), for an extensive
elaboration on the track system and theory-
which was rejected as violative of the fifth
amendment as practiced in the District of Co-
lumbia inasmuch as Negroes were given reduced
educations based ol intelligence tests standard-
ized on white middle class children. Id. at 443.
129 Standardized Ability Tests at 734.
130 The child who scores poorly is placed in a
lower class with less challenging work and
often less competent teaching. On the next
The New Equality?
Preferential Treatment, Black Capitalism,
and Benevolent Quotas
As has been suggested or implied during
the course of analysis thus far, merely
breaking down racial barriers that have im-
peded the progress of Negroes to date may
be insufficient to provide them with truly
equal opportunity.1 32 Recent controversy
has touched upon a concept denominated
"preferential treatment," which actually
may be a misnomer for a situation in which
Negroes would be treated according to their
needs, or compensated remedially for short-
comings which are the result of past dis-
crimination. One argument for such a
position has analogized the situation to a
foot race in which one of the runners has
been shackled.
We could not simply remove his chains and
let the race continue. Not only would he
then be far behind in the race, but also,
from want of exercise and various other
disabilities he would be much less able to
continue. . . . [T]he only treatment con-
sistent with equality is one which does not
merely allow the foot-race to proceed but
test, instead of having had a chance to catch
up with middle class children, he is further
behind. At the end of twelve years (if he
stays in school) his graduation with a record
of bad grades in low courses fulfills the
tests' predictions.
Id. at 735.
131 See notes 54-55 and accompanying text
supra.
132 And to emphasize once again, to the extent
that a denial of equal oppqrtunity results more
from perpetuation of the effects of socio-eco-
nomic conditions than from active racial dis-
crimination, the problem is much broader than
a strictly Negro one.
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which somehow propels the last place run-
ner back into contention. 3 3
It is submitted that programs or activities
which are compensatorily motivated can
be a legitimate, effective means to achiev-
ing a society in which there will be greater
equal opportunity.
Skepticism and opposition towards such
new approaches to the Negro problem pri-
marily center around concern for the divi-
sive effects which they are likely to have.
134
The problem is viewed to lay primarily
among the middle class, 135 but such a general
categorization may be an oversimplified
characterization of the problem based upon
its most obvious manifestations. 136 None-
133 Kaplan, supra note 5, at 365.
134 See, e.g., id. at 375 & n.26; Vieira, Racial
Imbalance, Black Separatism, and Permissible
Classification by Race, 67 MIcH. L. REV. 1553,
1611 (1969). Merely ending discriminatory prac-
tices has already led to threatened strikes. See
What Unions Are-And Are Not-Doing for
Blacks, TIME, Sept. 26, 1969, at 88.
135 See, e.g., The Troubled American, NEws-
WEEK, Oct. 6, 1969, at 32:
With little equity but his mortgaged home
and his union card, the white worker is
especially resistant to integration efforts that
appear to threaten his small stake in the
world.
Polls indicated, that the middle-class white be-
lieved that the Negro has a better chance than
he to get well-paying jobs and good housing
at a reasonable cost. Id. at 45. In addition, he
is generally of the opinion that a Negro's edu-
cational opportunities are just as good as a
white's, and prefers improving Negro schools
to moving toward integration. Id. The validity
of these assumptions is, at best, questionable.
136 Such a generalization may be invalid insofar
as the better educated, financially influential
classes may be better able to disguise their
prejudices and insulate themselves from integra-
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theless, the factor of overriding importance
should be a determination as to the very
real necessity for equal opportunity fol-
lowed by a wholehearted commitment to
achieve that goal. 137 The likelihood that
such actions may very naturally have di-
visive effects initially should not forestall
action, thereby leading to increasing racial
tensions with concomitantly greater divi-
siveness. The posture which activities in
each of the three areas under analysis
might take in this direction is varied.
While it has been recognized that merely
putting an end to discrimination in employ-
ment may be insufficient in advancing the
Negro cause, 138 preferential treatment has
not received legislative sanction as a means
for overcoming the inertia which exists."39
tion efforts. See Kovarsky, supra note 45, at
829.
137 Emotional considerations, however, should
not be entirely overlooked, and may play a
significant role in the steps to be taken toward
achieving equal opportunity in order to keep
divisiveness at a minimum. It may be necessary
for legislators and judges to empathize with
those who will be most directly affected by
decisions in this area, which decisions should be
firm and reflect considerations for the interests of
all concerned.
138 See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
139 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) provides in pertinent
part:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall
be interpreted to require any employer . . .
[or] labor organization . . . to grant pref-
erential treatment to any individual or to any
group because of the race . . . of such
individual or group on account of an im-
balance which may exist with respect to the
total number or percentage of persons of any
race . . . employed by any employer referred
or classified for employment by any employ-
ment agency . . . admitted to membership or
Active recruitment of qualified Negroes
equal to that for qualified whites has been
suggested as a constitutionally preferable
alternative to preferential hiring,140 but the
fact remains that until the Negro has re-
ceived the education or technical training
that racial discrimination has denied him,
there will be fewer qualified Negroes to fill
these positions than there might otherwise
be. Perhaps the most promising course of
action would be implementation of the
socio-economic theory of "Black Capital-
ism."
Essentially, the theory of Black Capital-
ism advocates the initiation and encourage-
ment of Negro entrepreneurship.' 4 1 Major
classified by any labor organization, or ad-
mitted to, or employed in, any apprenticeship
or other training program, in comparison
with the total number or percentage of persons
of such race . . . in any community, State,
section or other area ...
(Emphasis added.) Nor is it likely that state laws
advocating preferential hiring, to cover those em-
ployers not within the scope of title VII, see note
49 supra, will be adopted. See Garfinkel & Cahn,
supra note 7, at 371-72. In fact, while a majority
of the nation would like to see the Negroes'
position in society improved, preferential job
treatment is not, in the eyes of a majority, an
acceptable means to that end. See Harris &
Hopper, The Real Change Has Just Begun, LIFE:
INTO THE 70's, at 104 (Special Issue, January
1970). Nor are preferential admissions policies
at universities viewed favorably according to one
poll. The New Mood On Campus, NEWSWEEK,
Dec. 29, 1969, at 43. However, the statute does
not proscribe considerations along these lines,
and the OFCC's Philadelphia Plan, see note 71
supra, indicates, as one example, conscious efforts
at overcoming racial imbalances resulting from
past discrimination.
140 See, e.g., Garfinkel & Cahn, supra note 7, at
372.
141 See generally BLACK CAPITALISM; McKersie,
obstacles to be overcome in such an en-
deavor are the lack of available investment
capital1 42 and the lack of requisite mana-
gerial skills due primarily to poorer edu-
cational backgrounds. 14 3 Successful imple-
mentation of such a program will create
more jobs which will in turn generate more
income within the Negro community,
thereby enabling the Negro to improve his
own standard of living.144 Self-improve-
Vitalize Black Enterprise, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-
Oct. 1968, at 88.
142 See, e.g., Note, Tax Exemption for Organiza-
tions Investing in Black Businesses, 78 YALE L.J.
1212, 1214 (1969). In addition to taking advan-
tage of tax exemptions, id., there have been more
recent efforts aimed at amassing capital to finance
Negro businesses. See, e.g., FRB Letter on Invest-
ment Banker Credit to Black Community, CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 77,734 (1969), announcing a
relaxation of Regulation T, section 220.7(c), in-
terpreting section 7 of the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934. Investment bankers, usually not
permitted to extend credit without collateral or
on any collateral other than securities, acting as
brokers in establishing or aiding in establishing
new banks located in and operated by members
of a black community can make unsecured loans
to black entrepreneurs. In addition, the Nixon
Administration has initiated Project Enterprise,
in which funds pledged by private corporations
will be doubled by the Government and used to
underwrite black businesses. See Delaney, Negro
Business Is Assured of Aid, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7,
1969, at 1, col. 5.
143 See generally BUSINESS LEADERSHIP AND THE
NEGRO CRISIS (E. Ginzberg ed. 1968). Somewhat
similar to the Administration's project, see note
142 supra, is a program called Capital Forma-
tion, which, in addition to providing capital funds,
provides sorely needed managerial consulting ser-
vices. See London Channeling Business Expertise
to Black Entrepreneurs, MGT. REV., Dec. 1969,
at 31.
144 Negro entrepreneurship does, however, have
several limitations on its effectiveness as an eco-
nomic equalizer. First, the number of jobs cre-
ated is likely to be small, at least to begin with,
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ment, in addition to its economic benefits,
will engender a feeling of pride and self-
satisfaction, thereby alleviating, to some
extent, the attitudinal and motivational
problems which presently impede the Ne-
gro also. 145
inasmuch as the businesses will probably be
small. Tax Exemption, supra note 143, at 1214.
Currently, there are only a dozen Negro busi-
nesses in Manhattan that employ ten or more
people. BLACK CAPITALISM 60. Second, the in-
come generated will contribute directly to the
economic development of the minority commun-
ity only to the extent that it is spent or reinvested
within the community. Tax Exemption, supra note
143, at 1214. Paradoxically, integration is an im-
pediment here inasmuch as there is sometimes a
tendency for Negroes to patronize better estab-
lishments outside the Negro community once the
opportunity presents itself. See BLACI CAPITALISM
63-64. Third, the profit motive might very well
cause Negro, as well as white entrepreneurs, to
hire trained, proven, stable employees who may,
in all likelihood, already be employed. Tax
Exemption, supra note 143, at 1214. Fourth, such
small scale enterprise cannot give these groups
the institutional power and economic parity neces-
sary for the social stability of their communities.
Id. An even more fundamental obstacle to suc-
cessful business may very well be the lack of
purchasing power in the Negro neighborhood to
begin with. See Kovarsky, supra note 45, at 826.
145 This is perhaps the greatest attribute of such
a proposal. With an initial start, the Negro will
thereafter be able to help himself. As one com-
mentator has pointed out, "benefits granted
are not nearly so sweet as benefits won and . . .
help, even from a benign overlord, is often seen
as humiliating and patronizing .... ." Kaplan,
supra note 5, at 382. Moreover, this is the tra-
ditional American way of advancing in our soci-
ety and should therefore meet with minimal
resistance. It provides the Negro with a mean-
ingful opportunity, and would be a departure
from past approaches which have been aptly
criticized by Mr. Cross:
Since the Negro unemployable is not needed
by our economic system, the simple act of
providing him with a job must remain a form
of charity. Jobs keep the dropout off the
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With increased economic power, the Ne-
gro will also have increased mobility and,
absent discrimination, a broader range of
prospective residences. Nevertheless, in or-
der to facilitate a transition to integrated
housing, the use of benign quotas may be
necessary to prevent the "invasion-succes-
sion sequence." Although a quota smacks
of discrimination insofar as the Negro or
white who seeks housing after his race's
quota has been filled will be denied it solely
on the ground of race, it is important to
keep in mind that this is a benign, and not
a malign, quota, the purpose of which is
to serve as a temporary transitional mea-
sure from segregated to integrated housing
patterns. 146 Likewise, the temporary nature
of the measure would appear to answer any
contentions that quotas will create a "strait-
jacket" for Negroes by freezing the ratio
beyond the time when such ratio was neces-
sary due to a change in conditions. 147 Ac-
cordingly, the place that such a benign
quota can play in the role of equal oppor-
tunity should be of overriding concern, and,
streets. Free hot dogs, Cokes and country out-
ings keeps the teenagers from rioting-a form
of fire insurance. But whose needs do these
programs basically satisfy, theirs or ours?
BLACK CAPITALISM 10.
146 See Navasky, supra note 96, at 65 (1960).
147 See, e.g., Hellerstein, supra note 95, at 558.
Aside from time lags due to administrative reac-
tion, there does not appear to be any reason why
such quotas should prove to be an inflexible han-
dicap. The biggest problem will more likely be
determining what the quotas should be for vari-
ous areas, determined according to the "tipping
point" for the area. The difficulty of weighing a
number of intangible factors affecting the tipping
point is further complicated by the number of ra-
cial or ethnic groups to be taken into considera-
tion in any given formulation, and will obviously
affect the administrative feasibility of such a plan.
if successful, could help to alleviate some
of the current problems of de facto school
segregation without abandoning the neigh-
borhood-school concept.
With the elimination of de facto school
segregation, the educational problem would
be solved insofar as the "inherently un-
equal" barrier to equal opportunity has
been removed. To further close the educa-
tional gap, compensatory or remedial edu-
cation courses may have to be provided
for the benefit of the culturally deprived.'
48
In addition, faculty selection may have to
be made with a view to obtaining those
teachers who are both willing and best
prepared to cope with the educational chal-
lenges of newly integrated education. 49
Along with corrections in the means for
148 See, e.g., Horowitz, Unseparate but Unequal
-The Emerging Fourteenth Amendment Issue
in Public School Education, 13 U.C.L.A.L. REV.
1147, 1148 (1966). Provisions for such courses
in desegregation plans have already been required
by some courts. See, e.g., Hobson v. Hansen, 269
F. Supp. 401, 515 (D.D.C. 1967); Miller v.
School Dist. No. 2, 256 F. Supp. 370, 377 (D.S.C.
1966).
149 See United States v. Indianola Mun. Separate
Sch. Dist., 410 F.2d 626, 630 (5th Cir. 1969).
In fact, a school board's recent decision to tem-
porarily replace its usual system of promotions
with one based on "sensitivity" to Negro prob-
lems, was upheld as a valid attempt to improve
the school performance of the ghetto population,
even though Negro teachers were favored thereby.
Porcelli v. Titus, 302 F. Supp. 726 (D.N.J. 1969).
Moreover, provisions in title IV of the 1964
Civil Rights Act appear to lend support to deci-
sions in this direction by authorizing special
training to improve the ability of personnel to
deal effectively with educational problems that
may arise from desegregation. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000c-3 (1964), and the making of grants to
school boards to reimburse them for similar
training programs that they might conduct, id.
§ 2000c-4(a).
125
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ability grouping to take account of the
Negroes' inherent disadvantages on stan-
dardized tests, conscious efforts made along
the lines herein described will have a direct
affect on advanced employment opportuni-
ties-the key to self-help-and an easing
of racial tensions.
A Problem of Racial Classification?
Yet, insofar as any of the corrective
measures heretofore mentioned are based
upon a consideration of race, opposition
is raised in the name of reverse discrimina-
tion. 150 Indeed, it is ironic that the four-
teenth amendment, originally passed to
secure the civil rights of the Negro, should
be used to prevent the results of a century
of racial discrimination from being cor-
rected. In an effort to provide the Negro
with truly equal opportunity, it is difficult
to conceive of a means for alleviating racial
imbalance or providing an initiative to busi-
ness without considering race.' 5 ' Although
we are now striving for Mr. Justice Harlan's
"color-blind" Constitution, 15 2 it should not
150 The problem of racial classification has re-
cently received extensive treatment elsewhere.
See generally Vieira, supra note 135. Not only is
there "reverse discrimination" against whites, but
there is also discrimination against other minority
groups. See Kaplan, supra note 5, at 373-74.
This further emphasizes the point made, that
the problem not be viewed as peculiar to any
race, but rather that it be viewed as the common
problem of the underprivileged.
151 See United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of
Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 877 (1966); Wright, supra
note 38, at 297.
152 In the lone dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson,
Mr. Justice Harlan's rejection of the "separate
but equal" doctrine was predicated on the belief
that our Constitution should be "color-blind."
163 U.S. at 559.
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be considered to be completely insensitive
to color where efforts are being made to
overcome problems which developed under
the protection of a constitutional construc-
tion that abetted schemes founded upon
racial considerations. It is submitted that
there is a compelling governmental purpose,
with means to achieving it reasonably re-
lated thereto, which can be upheld constitu-
tionally.153
The Japanese Relocation Cases'5 exem-
plify instances where racial classifications
have been upheld as reasonable means to a
legitimate governmental purpose. Although
it might be argued that the classifications
were made during extraordinary circum-
stances, it may be countered that while
present circumstances may not appear to
command such urgency-a questionable
position at best-the classifications here are
designed to benefit and not to oppress, as
they were in the Relocation Cases, a par-
ticular group. Contentions that Brown 1
proscribes racial classification altogether
seem unwarranted when the companion
case is read in conjunction with it. Con-
cerning the position adopted in the Reloca-
153 In fact, several cases, each concerned with
education, have already either permitted or re-
quired corrective action to proceed on a "color-
conscious" basis. See, e.g., United States v. School
Dist. 151, 286 F. Supp. 786, 799 (N.D. Il1. 1968);
Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 516
(D.D.C. 1967); Fuller v. Volk, 230 F. Supp. 25,
34 (D.N.J. 1964).
154 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944), reh'g denied, 324 U.S. 885 (1945); Hira-
bayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
Both cases upheld measures taken with a view
to national security during World War II, which
deprived individuals of Japanese descent of some
of their fundamental rights as citizens of this
country.
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tion Cases, the Court pointed out in Bolling
v. Sharpe'5 5 that racial classifications are
"constitutionally suspect" and must be
"scrutinized with particular care" to deter-
mine the propriety of the motivation under-
lying them, and not that they are per se
unconstitutional. This is still the position
of the Supreme Court.
Another basis for opposition to these
compensatory approaches to the Negro
problem and to efforts at integration are
recent Negro demands for black separa-
tism. 156 However, demands for segregation
are no more acceptable from Negroes than
from whites. Moreover, studies have indi-
cated that an overwhelming majority of
Negroes disfavor separatism. 157 Inasmuch
as these demands are very likely the prod-
uct of frustration and a response to token-
ism, efforts should be directed at alleviating
the frustration by approaching the prob-
lem in more than a token manner, instead
of allowing these demands to be manipu-
lated to further the prejudicial interests of
various groups.
The Path from Here
Today, we have come full circle to the
position in which this country stood during
the Reconstruction Era. The proliferation
of civil rights legislation in the past decade
reflects the growing concern over an in-
tolerable problem and mirrors the activity
during the years following the Civil War.
155 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954); accord, McLaugh-
lin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
156 See Vieira, supra note 135, at 1622.
157 See SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES FOR THE NA-
TIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL Dis-
ORDERS 15-16 (1968).
While concern at that time was primarily
with restoring civil rights denied to Negroes
because of racial discrimination, today the
civil rights problem is seen in a broader
perspective as the concept of civil rights
expands to meet changes in society and as
the problem is recognized as more than a
racial one. It has been pointed out, how-
ever, with respect to the racial problem,
that
Major civil rights are little more than pa-
per legalities for American citizens who are
black. Laws against discrimination in em-
ployment, in housing, in education, in vot-
ing, and in varied federal programs have
scarcely begun to eliminate the exclusion
and disadvantages inflicted upon a percent-
age of the American citizenry who are not
white. This failure can mean only that
whites continue the acts, established as il-
legal, that perpetuate the discriminatory
patterns.15 s
Such an observation encourages responses
from individuals who readily contend that
changes in the law cannot improve the sit-
uation since it is the minds and feelings of
men that must be changed. Lest such a view
encourage the continuation of a timid or
laissez faire approach to the problem, it
should be remembered that
[n]ew law, enforced, compels new behavior.
Behavior repeated daily comes to seem
normal, and attitudes change. Illusions tend
to vanish. 59
The approach which such a view advocates
apparently has been adopted by the execu-
158 Clark & Clark, supra note 11, at 80.
159 Larson, supra note 3, at 514 (quoting Eric
Sevareid from LOOK, July 9, 1968, at 28) (em-
phasis added).
tive1 60 and judiciary branches 61 of the
Government, and proposals for stronger
legislation have been made to the legisla-
tive branch.1 12
The tools for the job are available; they
merely have to be used. Jones restored the
thirteenth amendment to its intended scope.
It has given rise to the very real likelihood
that other dormant sections of legislation
passed during the Reconstruction Era will
be revitalized, and that new, stronger legis-
lation will be enacted pursuant to the
thirteenth amendment to remove the
"badges and incidents" of slavery. As to
the fourteenth amendment, the judicially
imposed state action limitation has been all
160 Despite strong opposition, the Administra-
tion's Philadelphia Plan, see note 71 supra, has
weathered several storms. Initially, the Comp-
troller General issued an opinion declaring it to
be an unlawful violation of title VII's proscrip-
tion against racial quotas. 38 L.W. 2126 (1969).
Thereafter, the Attorney General issued an opin-
ion in favor of the Plan's validity. 38 L.W. 2191
(1969). Congressional action was then taken in
an attempt to destroy the Plan. Causing the most
concern was the Senate's rider to the Supple-
mental Appropriation Bill, providing that no
funds to be appropriated .were to be available to
finance any agreement held illegal by the Comp-
troller General. See 38 L.W. 2376 (1970). How-
ever, the Administration's successful suasion of
Congress preserved the Plan. See A Narrow
Victory for Blacks, TIME, Jan. 5, 1970, at
49-50. Nonetheless, the Plan has not as yet with-
stood a test before the Supreme Court as to its
constitutionality.
161 The Supreme Court's uncompromising posi-
tion with respect to desegregation, as manifested
in Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ.,
has begun to meet with some success as Southern
communities yield to the Court's position. See
The End of an Era, supra note 126.
162 A recent study made by the Commission on
Civil Rights has found racial discrimination to be
substantial at the state and local governmental
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but officially removed. 63 In deciding Jones
on thirteenth amendment grounds, the
Court explicitly recognized the possibility
of using the fourteenth amendment to reach
private acts of discrimination, but com-
mented that its decision based upon the
thirteenth amendment made it unnecessary
to go any further. 6
4
One thing is clear. Whatever course of
action is taken in the future, it must lead
levels, and has recommended that these govern-
mental bodies be removed from the exempt status
they now enjoy under title VII, see note 49 supra.
See U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, News
Release, Aug. 12, 1969.
163 The gradual erosion of the state action limi-
tation can be traced through the following cases,
each of which broadened the scope of state action
in some manner in an effort to strike down activi-
ties infringing the civil rights of others. Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (company-owned
town performed governmental function and was
therefore subject to same constitutional prohibi-
tions as state); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948) (judicial enfor cement of racially restric-
tive covenant for benefit of third parties consti-
tuted state action within purview of fourteenth
amendment's proscription); Burton v. Wilming-
ton Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961)
(activities of state's lessee constituted state ac-
tion); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745
(1966) (false reports made by individuals and
leading to the arrest of Negroes held sufficient
to sustain conviction of defendants for con-
spiracy to deprive Negroes of their civil rights
under 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1964), enacted pursuant
to fourteenth amendment); United States v.
Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966) (conviction of pri-
vate citizens under § 241 for criminal conspiracy
upheld where they were acting in concert with
state officials). Guest and Price were the first
indication that the state action limitation might
no longer be viable. See generally on the subject
of state action Horan, Law and Social Change:
The Dynamics of the "State Action" Doctrine,
17 J. PuB. L. 258 (1968); Van Alstyne & Karst,
State Action, 14 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1961).
164 392 U.S. at 413 n.5.
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to an equal opportunity society. The Ne-
gro problem is real; it is not going to be
solved with empty promises, ineffective leg-
islation, or poorly enforced, effective legis-
lation.
It is unfortunate to think that the severe
civil disorders of recent years may very
well be the only reason for the increased
attention being given civil rights today.
Such is a sad commentary on the state of
affairs in a society of laws. Use of the law
to perpetuate selfish, prejudicial interests
can no longer be tolerated; it breeds con-
tempt and disrespect for the law, and forces
the oppressed to respond by breaking the
law. We have reached a point in our na-
tion's history that presents a most difficult
challenge. If it is approached with a view
to long-range objectives, temporary divi-
siveness can be tolerated as an incidental to
the means to those objectives. If it is ap-
proached pragmatically, and we fail to meet
the real challenge, it is difficult to predict
anything favorable for the future. As one
commentator has cautioned,
we should understand clearly the na-
ture of the harm. For if this generation is
deprived of equity under the guise of civil
rights legislation, the bitterness of their
children will know no bounds. 165
165 Gould, supra note 61, at 1074.
